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Introduction
In this paper we examine the properties of a standard overlapping generation model where both bequests and intergenerational time transfers are available. The effects of bequests within overlapping generation models have been widely studied. Since the seminal papers of Becker (1965) and Barro (1974) , many papers have been devoted to the OLG-model with altruism (see for example Burbidge, 1983 , Weil, 1987 , Abel, 1987 ). 1 Almost all of these studies only consider transfers of good (bequests and/or gifts). Only a few studies consider transfers of time, and generally from an empirical point of view, like Ioannides and Kahn (1994) . A particular study is that of Cardia Here we assume that labor supply decisions are endogenous as the young can choose to work at home on a home produced good or on the market place to produce a market good. We Þnd that the labor supply of the young responds differently to bequests and time transfers although both types of transfers increase capital accumulation.
An important issue is whether the degree of altruism that is necessary for bequests to be operative and for households to behave altruistically in standard dynastic models 1 For a simple presentation see chapter 3 in Blanchard and Fisher (1989). is the same for time transfers to be operative. Our results show that time transfers may take place for degrees of altruism that are not sufficient to generate bequests. 2 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section II, the model is presented. In section III we study the dynamic of capital accumulation in the cases of operative and non-operative bequests. In section IV we derive the labor supply and the steady state value of capital stock. Their response to higher degrees of altruism is examined. Four cases are considered: no transfers, bequests only, time transfers only and both transfers operative. In section V we present a numerical example and in section VI conclusions are drawn. A technical appendix at the end (section VII) discusses the special case where labor supply is at its maximum.
The Model
We use a two-period overlapping generations model. Individuals work when they are young and retire when they are old. We assume that households are one-sided altruistic and maximize their utility which combines their life-cycle utility with the utility of their immediate descendants. Population grows at the constant rate n, N t is the number of young individuals born at time t and (1 + n) is the number of children born to the young. Both a market good and a non-market good enter in the utility function and the old may transfer resources to the young in two ways: via bequests and via transfers in the form of time. Time transfers are modeled by allowing the old to participate in the production of the home good consumed by the young. Altruistic households maximize:
where:
i c t and d t+1 are the consumptions of the market good during youth and old age, respectively, and ϕ t and ψ t+1 are their consumptions of the non-market good. The parameter γ < 1 measures the degree of altruism and δ is the subjective discount factor. The home good consumed by the young is produced by using time, λ t , a market good, a t , and a Cobb-Douglas technology:
The time input λ t combines the time spent by the young and the time spent by the old in producing the home good consumed by the young. We assume perfect substitutability between the time of the old and that of the young in the production of the home good of the young:
l t is the time spent by the young producing the market good, 1 − l t is the time spent on the production of the home good. The old spend µ t units of time producing their own home good and 1−µ t units of time to help producing their children's home good.
The old are less efficient than the young for values of β smaller than 1/(1 + n). 3 The home good consumed by the old is produced using their own time µ t+1 , a market good, b t+1 , and a Cobb-Douglas production function: Agents take the real wage w t and the gross real interest rate R t as given. Altruistic households maximize (1) subject to the following resource constraints:
s t and l t w t are the saving and the labor income of the young agent in period t,
respectively, x t is the bequest that he receives in period t from his parents and
(1 + n)x t+1 is the bequest that he is to give to his children. The life-cycle budget constraint is obtained by combining the two resource constraints (equations 5 and 6):
In each period bequests and time transfers must be non-negative and labor supply and time transfers must be smaller or equal to 1:
In order to calculate the optimal decisions for all generations one considers the following Lagrangian expression: 4
where q t is the Lagrangian multiplier and is the shadow price of bequests. The Þrst order conditions with respect to c t , a t , d t+1 , b t+1 , l t , µ t+1 and x t+1 , are:
It is useful to notice that for values of α 1 = α 3 = α 4 = β = 0 the altruistic agent maximizes:
which corresponds to the standard maximization problem with both a market good and leisure in the utility function.
and the transversality condition is (Michel, 1990) :
On the production side, competitive Þrms use the Cobb-Douglas production function to produce the sole market good in the economy. Given that N t is the size of the young population at time t, total labor force at time t is L t = N t l t and total output is
With k t = Kt Nt , we can deÞne output per capita, y t , as:
ProÞt maximization implies that factors are paid the value of their marginal product.
Assuming that capital fully depreciates after one period, we have that:
As is standard of overlapping generations model, capital market equilibrium is summarized by:
so that the savings by the young become productive capital the following period.
Goods market equilibrium is given by the aggregate resource constraint and can be obtained by using the resource constraints (5) and (6), equations (19) and (20) and the capital accumulation equation (21):
3 Study of the Dynamic of Capital Accumulation
In a model with altruism where negative bequests are not allowed, there are two different situations depending on whether the degree of altruism, γ, is sufficient to generate non-negative bequests or not. For low values of γ (γ <γ) the economy behaves as if households were selÞsh because they cannot leave negative bequests.
For high values of γ (γ ≥γ) households have an inÞnite dynastic horizon. To study the dynamic of capital accumulation we only need to distinguish between the cases of operative and non-operative bequests as time transfers are a-temporal decisions that do not change the dynamic of the model. In this section we derive the dynamic of capital with and without bequests and the threshold value of γ,γ. We consider Þrst the no bequest case. In this case x t = x t+1 = 0 and equation (7) becomes the life-cycle budget constraint:
Using equations (9), (10) and (11), labor income veriÞes:
can be interpreted as the modiÞed discount factor where α 1 and α 3 represent the weights of the market good in the production of the non-market good of the young and old, respectively. The economy's saving is equal to the labor income of the young minus their consumption:
Using equations (19) and (21) we can now derive the equation of motion for capital:
The dynamic of capital stock depends on α, ∆ and l t . In the next section we study the labor supply and show that it is constant over time. With non operative bequests the capital accumulation equation is the only dynamic equation of the model. To Þnd the critical value of γ,γ, such that bequests are not operative, we use equations (8),
(23) and (25). We have that:
Thus condition (16) for zero bequests is equivalent to:
When α 1 = α 3 the threshold valueγ becomes the standard threshold value found in the literature on dynastic altruism when a Cobb-Douglas production function is assumed (see Weil, 1987) . There bequests are not operative if:
The Dynamic of Capital for Positive Bequests (x t > 0)
We now consider the case of operative bequests. Using equations (17) and (22) we can rewrite the national income identity as follows:
DeÞning z t as the shadow value of output for the dynasty (see also Michel and Pestieau, 1998) :
Using equations (17), (20) and (27):
This is a Þrst-order differential equation which has an explosive root ( 1 γα ). Rearranging equations (6), (10), (11) , (20) and (21) it can be shown that:
By multiplying both sides of the previous equation by q t+1 we can easily see that transversality condition (18) implies a transversality condition on the shadow value 9 of output, z t+1 :
Therefore the optimality conditions imply that z t is a constant and that it is equal to:
As can be seen the shadow value of output, z(γ), is an increasing function of the degree of altruism, γ. Since in the case studied here bequests are positive, x t+1 > 0 and
γ+∆ 1−γα > 0 we have that, for bequests to be operative, both relations have to be true and γ has to be greater thanγ :
This is the same critical value we found in the previous section except that there bequests were not operative for γ ≤γ. To Þnd the equation of motion for capital accumulation we use equations (27) and (29):
Substituting out z(γ):
We use equation (30) to Þnd the equation of motion for bequests:
As a ratio to output, bequests are always an increasing function of the degree of altruism:
Study of the Equilibrium
There are 8 possibilities that result from the three inequalities l ≤ 1, µ ≤ 1 and x ≥ 0 depending on which of these constraints is binding. But for µ = 1 it is necessarily true that l < 1 and therefore 6 possibilities remain. We show in this section that the critical value of β for positive intergenerational time transfers is a decreasing function of γ. In the technical appendix we examine the two special cases where l = 1. We summarize the different cases on the plane β, γ in Figure 1 below and examine each of the 4 cases with l < 1 in a separate subsection. Figure 1 ). It implies l t < 1. Rearranging equations (3), (13) and (23), we have that:
which implies that the labor supply of the young is independent of γ and β and is given by:
From equations (3) and (14) we can derive the restrictions on β for µ t = 1: 
and the steady state of capital stock, k * I , is:
Equations (35) and (36) show that capital accumulation and the steady state value of capital are also not a function of β and γ.
Case II (positive bequests x t > 0 and no time transfers µ t = 1)
We now consider the case where the bequests motive is strong enough (γ >γ) to generate positive bequests but β is too low to have time transfers (region II, Figure 1 ).
This case is standard in the literature on dynastic altruism (see Barro, 1974 and Weil, 1987 ) except that here the labor supply is endogenous. To derive the labor supply of the young we rearrange equations (3), (8), (12) , (20) and (26):
We substitute out k t+1 using equations (19) and (29):
and obtain:
It can be shown that for values of γ >γ, as γ increases the labor supply Þrst decreases and than increases again to the no-bequest level, l I : From the optimality condition for µ t+1 when µ t+1 is equal to 1 (equation 15) and
l II < 1, we have:
which is equivalent to: is strong enough to make bequests operative since γ >γ.
The equation of motion for capital is derived by substituting equation (37) in equation (33):
It is clear that since γl II (γ) is increasing in γ, capital is, as is standard in the literature on dynastic altruism, an increasing function of γ. The steady state level of capital is:
Bequests in the steady state are given by:
Case IIIa (no bequests x t = 0 and time transfers µ t < 1)
This case is speciÞc to our model and it shows that there will be values of γ smaller thanγ for which although there are no bequests there are altruistic transfers in the form of time (region IIIa and IIIb, Figure 1 ). Here we assume that l < 1 and limit our analysis to the region IIIa. We use equation (23) in equation (13) to substitute out consumption:
Using equations (3) and (15) we can derive λ t as a function of l t :
Combining the two previous equations, we have that:
When only time transfers are operative the labor supply of the young is increasing in both γ and β. Therefore time transfers and bequests produce qualitatively different effects on the labor supply of the young. We showed in fact in the previous section that an increase in the degree of altruism does not increase the labor supply of the young above the no-bequest level, l I and may decrease it. Using equation (3) it can be shown that time transfers from the old to the young, 1 − µ t , are also a positive function of β :
Using equation (41) and the condition for positive time transfers, i.e. µ t < 1, we can
Þnd the values of β for which there are positive time transfers:
This is the same threshold value as in case I. Here for values of β higher than β 1,γ≤γ (regions IIIa and IIIb) intergenerational altruism in not strong enough to generate bequests but β is sufficiently high for households to make altruistic transfers of time.
Using equation (41) we can Þnd for which values of β time transfers are positive and also l t < 1 :
For values of β smaller than β 2,γ≤γ , labor supply is inferior to 1 (region IIIa) and
for values higher or equal than β 2,γ≤γ , labor supply is equal to 1 (region IIIb). The threshold value of β is decreasing in γ and increasing in ∆. 6 It does not depend on α, 6 It is easy to verify that for both i = 1 and i = 2, β i,γ≤γ coincides with the limit of β i,γ>γ for γ =γ when γ converges toγ.
the degree of capital intensity of the economy on whichγ depends upon.
With constant labor supply, the dynamic equation for capital accumulation (using equation 25) and the steady state of capital are:
and:
As in case II the capital stock is an increasing function of the degree of altruism, γ. In this case it is also an increasing function of the degree of efficiency of the old generation, β.
4.4
Case IVa (positive bequests x t > 0 and time transfers µ t < 1)
This case incorporates cases II and IIIa. Here γ and β are sufficiently high to have both bequests and time transfers (see regions IVa and IVb in Figure 1 ). Using equations (19) and (28):
To Þnd the labor supply of the young substitute out y t and q t using equations (3), (8), (15) and (17):
The equation of motion for capital and its steady state value are derived by substituting equation (43) in equation (31):
It can be easily shown that the capital stock is increasing in γ and β, as in IIIa. It is however not possible to establish analytically the effects of γ on labor supply. The old are transferring time to the young and the young can increase their labor supply to produce the market good (as in case IIIa). This positive effect on the labor supply can offset the initial negative wealth effect (which we discussed for case II). In the next section we use a numerical example and show that for reasonable parameter values labor supply is an increasing function of γ and the negative wealth effect is dominated by the other effect.
Since k * IV is increasing in β, bequests are also an increasing function of β. This is an interesting result as it shows that, in the steady state, time transfers do not crowd out bequests. This results is due to the fact that time transfers increase capital accumulation further and that higher capital accumulation increases output and therefore bequests (see results in section 3). Using equations (3), (15) and (44) we Þnd that time transfers are:
Time transfers are a positive function of the degree of altruism and of the degree of efficiency of the old, β.
To Þnd the threshold value of β for which we have positive time transfers we use equation (46). Positive time transfers imply:
This is the same critical value we found for case II. For values of β higher than β 1,γ>γ (regions IVa and IVb) there are both time transfers and bequests. We can use (45) to Þnd the values of β such that l IV a < 1:
Numerical Example
In this section we use a numerical example to illustrate the role of altruism on the labor supply of the young and on the steady state level of capital stock. We let γ and β vary and assume a subjective discount factor, δ, equal to .5 which, considering one period equivalent to 25 years, implies a yearly subjective discount factor of 0.02. We assume a labor share, 1 − α, equal to .65. We don't have strong priors for the weights of time and market goods and simply assume them to be all equal to .5. Our analytical results suggested that these parameters don't play an important role in determining the effects of γ and β on labor supply and capital accumulation. However because α affects the threshold value of γ for positive bequests but does not affect the threshold value of β for positive time transfers we also consider the case of an economy with higher capital intensity (with α = .5). The parameters used in these two scenarios are summarized in table 1. 
Conclusions
This paper has examined the role of intergenerational time transfers in an overlapping generation model where bequests are also included. We have shown that although bequests and time transfers have both positive effects on capital accumulation, they act through different channels. Bequests increase savings and capital accumulation.
This capital accumulation does not require the young to work more in the production of the market good. Time transfers instead increase capital accumulation by relaxing 21 the young's time constraint and thus making them work more. 7 We have also shown that time transfers may take place when intergenerational altruism is not sufficient to generate bequests. The critical level for operative time transfers depends on different variables than the ones we need for operative bequests.
In particular, operative bequests depend on the capital intensity of the economy, while time transfers do not. The lower the capital intensity of the economy the higher is the critical value for positive bequests while the critical value for positive time transfers is not affected. This has an interesting implication with intuitive appeal: for less developed economies although the degree of altruism may no be sufficient to generate bequests, there may still be important altruistic intergenerational transfers in the form of time transfers.
Technical Appendix
Here we examine two special cases of case III and IV where the labor supply is exactly equal to 1. These two cases are represented in Figure 1 by regions IIIb and IVb, respectively. 7 In this paper we assumed a log-linear utility function and Cobb-Douglas production functions. We know that the condition of positive operative bequests can be studied in a more general framework and produces similar conclusions, see for example Weil (1987) . Cardia and Ng (2002) use numerical simulation methods to understand the steady-state implications of intergenerational transfers of time and of bequests, on child care policies. They assume a CES utility function and CES home production functions and Þnd that time transfers play an important role on the steady-state level of income and capital. The qualitative results are very similar to those found in this paper. There too time transfers encourage labor supply while bequests have an income effect which discourages market work.
7.1 Case IIIb (no bequests x t = 0, time transfers µ t < 1 and l t = 1)
We Þrst consider the case of no bequests (see region IIIb). In this case l t = 1 implies that λ t = (1 − l t ) + β(1 − µ t ) = β(1 − µ t ). We also have that for time transfers to be positive µ t = δα 4 γα 2 λ t (from equation 15) and therefore:
In this special case time transfers are an increasing function of the degree of altruism but do not depend on β. It can be easily seen from equation (25) that given that l t = 1 both capital stock and its steady state level are independent of either γ or β.
By using equations (12) and (23):
Substituting the λ t so obtained in λ t = β(1 − µ t ) and using the previous result, we have that for both time transfers to be positive and the labor supply to be 1 we must have that:
≡ β 2,γ≤γ 7.2 Case IVb (positive bequests x t > 0, time transfers µ t < 1 and l t = 1)
We now consider the case of positive bequests (see region IVb). In this case it is easy to verify that l t = 1 implies, as in the previous case, that:
Rearranging equations (8), (17), (19) and (28) we have that:
Using the fact that λ t = β(1 − µ t ) and substituting out µ t = µ IV b we Þnd that with l t = 1 for bequests and time transfers to be both operative we must have that: β > (γα 2 + δα 4 ) (1 − α)(1 + n)z(γ) ≡ β 2,γ>γ . .5 .5
